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Abstract: In this paper, I conduct a conceptual metaphor analysis of the 
“Wheel of Life”, a pictorial representation of Buddhist philosophical concepts. 
Abstract concepts that define our everyday realities (e.g. states, causation) are 
claimed by some to be metaphorically structured, and reducible to a universal 
set of primary metaphors (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999), while argued by 
others to be structured by non-metaphorical cultural understandings instead 
(QUINN, 1991). Recognizing the need for empirical testing of the universalist 
claim, I analyze Buddhist conceptualizations of states-of-being, rebirth and 
event structure for their reducibility to primary metaphors. I show that while 
some concepts are reducible to universal primary metaphors, others might be 
constituted by culture-specific understandings instead. I also question the 
concept of primary metaphor itself, suggesting that supposedly universal 
primary metaphors already carry culturally-biased preconceptions, and urge 
the Lakoffian school to justify the assumed universality of subjective 
experiences which give rise to primary metaphors. 
Keywords: Buddhism; primary metaphors; conceptual metaphors; cultural 
models. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The history of metaphor study has seen it evolve from being 
treated as an esoteric poetic device to one that is claimed to play an 
important role in our conceptual systems. Today, most would likely agree 
that the locus of metaphor is no longer confined to language, but 
extended to thought as well. Of particular impact has been the 
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hypothesis that most of our abstract concepts, and the way we reason 
about them, are metaphorically structured (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1980, 
p. 3). When combined with other findings in cognitive science, such as 
the fact that thought is mostly unconscious and the mind is inherently 
tied to bodily functions (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999), it becomes 
plausible to claim that much of our everyday subjective experiences and 
judgements are metaphorically conceptualized via domains of 
“sensorimotor experience”. For example, Grady (1997) suggests that we 
conceptualize understanding an idea (subjective experience) as the 
grasping of an object (sensorimotor experience). This occurs because of 
our everyday tendency to obtain information about an object by grasping 
it, hence the development of an association between the two domains. 
Such “experientially grounded” mappings have been coined “primary 
metaphors”, and are claimed to exist in our human conceptual system 
(LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999, p. 46).  
Primary metaphors have thus acquired a powerful theoretical 
status. They supposedly form the basic building blocks that complex 
metaphors can be broken down into. Complex metaphors are defined by 
Lakoff and Johnson as “stable, conventionalized, entrenched and fixed” 
(1999, p. 60) mappings between conceptual domains. A classic example 
is the PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor (LAKOFF; 
JOHNSON, 1999, p. 60-73), instantiated by expressions such as “having 
lost one’s way in life”, “being on the highway of success”, and “reaching 
one’s life goals”. Indeed, in many cultures, there is a firm belief that 
people are supposed to have purposes in life, and act to fulfill them. 
Lakoff and Johnson claim that this complex metaphor can be 
decomposed, firstly, into the culture-specific belief that one’s life should 
be proactively purposeful; and secondly, into two separate primary 
metaphors, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE 
MOTIONS, which collectively provide the schematic structure of 
journeys that underlies the complex metaphorical mapping.  
This also entails a claim of universality. If metaphor is pervasive in 
our everyday thought, and complex metaphors inevitably are reduced to 
a set of correspondences between our subjective judgements and 
sensorimotor experiences, then it becomes inevitable that as functioning 
humans we all possess the same set of primary metaphors. The theory of 
conflation (JOHNSON, 1997) suggests that as young children, our 
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sensorimotor experiences are undistinguished from our subjective 
judgements. For example, the subjective feeling of affection is constantly 
correlated with the warm sensation of physical proximity. This results in 
a conflation between the two domains, which persists throughout our 
formative years. As we develop, we eventually separate the two domains, 
while preserving the cross-domain associations. Narayanan’s (1997) 
neural theory of metaphor fleshes out more concretely the viewpoint 
above by claming that actual neural connections are triggered during the 
conflation period. From these strands of investigation, Grady (1997) 
devised a tentative list of primary metaphors which pairs various 
sensorimotor experiences with subjective judgements. Examples include 
AFFECTION IS WARMTH, HAPPY IS UP, TIME IS MOTION, 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS etc, demonstrating that a wide range of 
concepts are conceived of in terms of an equally wide range of 
sensorimotor domains. To further demonstrate the entrenchment of 
primary metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) also argued that key 
tenets of the western philosophical tradition are actually structured by 
conceptual metaphors, reducible to primary metaphors. It is important 
to investigate this universalist claim, and this is best done through the 
empirical analysis of philosophical concepts from an alternative tradition, 
to see if they are indeed structured in the same way. 
This paper aims to provide such an investigation by examining 
several aspects of Buddhist philosophy, pictorially depicted by the 
“Wheel of Life” diagram (see Appendix). 
Displayed on the walls of Tibetan Buddhist institutions, the wheel 
symbolizes the existential condition of living beings. It is a succinct and 
authoritative symbol of Buddhist philosophical concepts such as 
samsara, states of being, and liberation. 
Comparative philosophy informs us of the different 
understandings humans have developed with regards to important 
concepts which structure our reality. These concepts range from belief 
about the afterlife to basic spatial-temporal perceptions. While one could 
attribute these differences to historical or cultural evolution, the 
cognitive science approach makes us probe deeper into the individual’s 
neurobiological makeup instead of larger societal processes. Although 
Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge the role of cultural beliefs in shaping 
philosophy (1999, p. 341), they argue that the “cognitive resources” 
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employed to understand these theories “are not arbitrary or merely 
culturally constructed”, but “depend on the nature of our embodied 
experience” (1999, p. 341). Hence, what they are claiming is that amidst 
the panoramic diversity of philosophical thought, all philosophy is 
fundamentally structured by a universal set of primary metaphors, with 
their overt differences a matter of cultural variation. I will directly test 
this claim by examining the concepts represented by the wheel for their 
reducibility to primary metaphor. In so doing, I will arrive at one of three 
possible theoretical destinations:  
 
a) Buddhist concepts are indeed constituted by conceptual 
metaphors, reducible to primary metaphors. Additionally, these 
primary metaphors are common across both Western and 
Buddhist philosophy. 
b) While some Buddhist concepts are structured by conceptual 
metaphors, informed by a universal pool of primary metaphors, 
there also exist concepts that are not structured in this way.  
c) Buddhist concepts are not structured by conceptual and 
primary metaphor. There is no conceivable experiential basis that 
structures these concepts. This is a logical but unlikely 
possibility, since there must be some common embodied 
experiences that are shared between peoples from different 
cultures. 
 
Conclusion i) would provide support for the universalist position. 
On the other hand, conclusion ii) would resonate with alternative 
schools of thought which downplay the constitutive role of metaphor in 
our conceptual system. Amongst these, the most prominent would be 
the notion of cultural models - shared understandings between a 
community of people that organize and mediate their experiences, 
expectations and behavior, and provide a framework for the 
interpretation of everyday realities (D’ANDRADE, 1990). 
Anthropologists believe that such models play a profound role in human 
thought, and metaphor usage is highly constrained by pre-existing 
cultural understandings. In her analysis of metaphors used in discourses 
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on American marriages, Naomi Quinn (1991) attempted to demonstrate 
that speakers select certain metaphors not because they are crucial in 
structuring understanding, but because these metaphors “provide 
satisfying mappings onto already existing cultural understandings” (1991, 
p. 65). In other words, metaphors merely reflect, and do not constitute 
the ideal marriage values of American culture such as lastingness and 
fulfillment.  
2 ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS ON CONCEPTUAL 
METAPHOR 
The contemporary theory of metaphor has its fair share of 
skeptics. Apart from the cultural anthropologists mentioned above, some 
believe that metaphorical comprehension and interpretation are actively 
constructed (GLUCKSBERG; MCGLONE, 1999), according to the 
requirements of the ongoing discourse. In this view, there are no pre-
existing mappings constraining the interpretation of metaphor. The 
claim is that the Lakoffian view attempts to account for discourse-level 
phenomena by an over-reliance on a theory of cognition, even though 
“cognitive theories of communication and thought are currently in a 
nascent, somewhat amorphous state” (GLUCKSBERG; MCGLONE, 
1999, p. 1557). 
Between the two opposite ends of embodiment and culture, there 
have also been attempts to pursue a middle path and explore the 
connection between the individual embodied mind and the cultural 
world that surrounds it. Gibbs (1999) suggests that as the human body 
interacts with the cultural world, culture-specific elements may exert 
influence on the nature of embodied experiences, and hence play a 
constitutive role in the formation of conceptual metaphors. 
Anthropologists in different cultural settings have noted that 
fundamental embodied experiences such as breathing, blushing and 
menstruation are themselves instilled with important cultural meanings 
(CSORDAS, 1994; BHARATI, 1985). Under this view, the possible 
notion of “cultural embodiment” (GIBBS, 1999) would present an 
interesting theoretical blend between the two ends. 
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However, whether cultural or cognitive models underlie 
metaphorical usage is ultimately an empirical issue. As mentioned, one 
way to conduct empirical testing is to unearth systematic patterns in 
linguistic expressions, to see if any particular target concept is 
consistently explicated via knowledge from a different conceptual 
domain. Ning Yu (1998) attempted to do this with the Chinese language, 
analyzing metaphorical conceptualizations of emotions, time, and event 
structure.  
Another approach is to analyze non-linguistic metaphors. As 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 57) put it, “not all conceptual metaphors 
are manifested in the words of a language. Some are manifested in 
grammar, others in gesture, art, or ritual”. Interest in pictorial metaphors 
and other forms of symbolism ranges from whether there can be a 
theory of metaphor in pictures at all, to establishing metaphor as being 
constantly depicted in non-linguistic forms (FORCEVILLE, 1998). 
Lakoff and Johnson’s implicit invitation to analyze non-linguistic 
metaphors is taken up in this paper, which examines the wheel in its 
pictorial form. 
2.1 Motivation for analyzing Buddhist philosophy 
Although Buddhism has been widely studied, its viability as a 
diagnostic ground for a universalist claim from a western academic 
background still holds considerable promise. As mentioned, there is a 
strong impetus to stretch the frontiers of empirical conceptual metaphor 
analysis to other languages and cultures (see SLINGERLAND, 2003, 
2004). Abundant with symbolism, Buddhism offers rich data for 
metaphor study. Having developed in India and evolved in other parts of 
Asia, Buddhism has been largely free from the influence of western 
philosophy, and it was not until the late nineteenth century that any 
substantial contact occurred (COLEMAN, 2001). From the perspective 
of investigating a universal claim, Buddhism thus becomes a good choice 
due to its relatively isolated development, yet profound influence on 
those within its reaches. 
 
ZHIMING – Investigating the universality of... 
459
2.2 Limitations of analysis 
Before commencing the analysis it is important to discuss its 
limitations in order to provide the appropriate scope and perspective, 
and to set the general direction that future research can follow.  
Firstly, it must be recognized that this is an introductory paper in 
exploring how conceptual metaphor can be applied to the Wheel, and 
therefore cannot possibly cover all the metaphors that are present. 
Concepts that are selected for analysis (i.e., states of being, perpetuation 
and event-structure) should however suffice for a general appreciation of 
how they differ from the western conceptualization, and what 
implications this bears.  
Secondly, I must stress that the analyzed concepts, or even the 
Wheel taken in its entirety, do not sufficiently compose a fully coherent 
Buddhist philosophical system. There are numerous other schools of 
thought in Buddhism, such as Hinayana, Mahayana, Vajrayana and Zen6. 
Doctrinal intricacies are obviously not a focus for this paper, and thus 
when the terms “Buddhism” and “Buddhist principles” are used, they 
refer to general concepts that are readily accepted by Buddhists across 
these denominations. 
In the next section, I will briefly introduce the Buddhist concepts 
that will be dealt with, and orientate readers to the various components 
of the Wheel. The main analyses of states of being, perpetuation and 
event structure will be conducted in sections three, four and five 
respectively. 
3 BUDDHIST CONCEPTS AND THE WHEEL OF LIFE 
3.1 Introduction to Buddhist philosophy 
The most important goal of Buddhists is to attain nirvana, or 
liberation. This refers to the escape from samsara, the endless cycle of 
deaths and rebirths. We experience samsara because through our actions, 
thoughts and speech, we continuously generate reactions. Death is 
6 Interested readers may refer to the classic by Huston Smith (1991), The World’s Religions: Our Great 
Wisdom Traditions, for an excellent introduction to the various schools. 
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merely an event within this stream of actions and reactions, and does not 
mean the cessation of the stream. As the physical body passes away, the 
consciousness lingers on, and enters into a new body so that the action-
reaction stream may continue. Depending on the merit of deeds 
committed in the previous life, the being will be reborn with the 
character traits associated with one of the six realms depicted in the 
Wheel. It may then, in the next life, live luxuriously like a god, or suffer 
like a hell-being. It may even be literally reborn as an animal, dominated 
by primal desires. 
However, the crucial point is that no matter what rebirth one 
takes, the cycle will be perpetuated as long as one continues to be bound 
by actions and reactions. The precise mechanism for this will be 
explained in section 6.2, via the concept of the twelve-fold chain of 
causation. To overcome samsara, living beings must eliminate the mental 
ills that plague them, as explained in section 2.4. Buddhist spiritual 
practice, known as following the Dharma, seeks nirvana by overcoming 
these ills. Upon nirvana, living beings are no longer subjected to samsara, 
and can obtain eternal peace.  
After this outline of the basic beliefs of Buddhism, we can now 
examine the various components of the Wheel, and understand the 
specific aspects that are represented in each component. 
3.2 Background - Buddha, yama, and the moon 
In the background, Yama, the mythical Lord of Death holds the 
Wheel in its hands. Yama’s iconographies are highly prolific in Indian 
culture, and he has been revered since the Vedic period in Hinduism 
(KNIPE, 1991). Yama clasping the wheel firmly reminds us that all living 
beings are under the control of death.  
In the top left and right corners, the moon and the Buddha 
himself are depicted respectively, with the latter pointing towards the 
former. The moon is a symbol of nirvana. By pointing to it, the Buddha 
is showing the way for living beings towards liberation. More 
importantly, this implies that he can only show the way, but the actual 
process has to be undertaken by the beings themselves. 
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3.3 Rim of Wheel – the twelve-fold chain of causation 
At the rim, twelve illustrations arranged in a circle represent the 
twelve-fold chain of causation, or the principle of “dependent 
origination”. This may prove perplexing to readers accustomed to more 
conventional notions of causation. Essentially, the principle postulates 
that the manifestation of this material universe is in a continuous, 
interrelated flux, with events mutually conditioned by one another. In 
other words, no material phenomenon can be pinned down as the 
singular effect of a singular cause. A popular example to illustrate this is 
using an oil lamp (KONG, 1999). Conditions that permit the burning of 
a flame include air, oil, heat and wick. In turn, the presence of any of 
these conditions depends on yet other factors. Thus, for any 
phenomenon, there is a complex set of circumstances leading to its 
manifestation, such that nothing is inherently permanent, or arise 
independently, with a definite starting or ending point. Conversely, the 
only way for a phenomenon to cease is upon the cessation of its causal 
conditions. The Buddha himself summarized this principle in the 
following aphoristic manner: 
 
When this is, that is. 
This arising, that arises. 
When this is not, that is not. 
This ceasing, that ceases. (KONG, 1999, p. 146) 
 
The principle of dependent origination applies to our individual 
existences as well. Owing to a series of linked conditions, our existence is 
perpetuated until we can take steps to cease them. The twelve 
illustrations symbolize these conditions, which are particular events or 
states of mind that living beings are subjected to. Together they form a 
causal chain, with one condition leading to another in a cycle. A 
summary table7 follows. 
 
 
7 Obviously, these illustrations are also metaphorical representations for the corresponding mind 
states. However, they are not the focus of this paper. 
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EVENT/STATE OF MIND  ILLUSTRATION 
Ignorance  Blind man 
Impulses/ activity Potter creating a new pot 
Consciousness Hyperactive monkey 
Name and form/identity Men in a boat 
Sensory perception and the mind House with a door and windows 
Contact between objects and senses Love-making couple  
Sensation Man with an arrow in his eye 
Craving Man drinking 
Clinging Monkey grasping fruits 
Becoming Pregnant woman 
Birth Child being born 
Death Man carrying a corpse 
Table 1 – The principle of dependent origination. 
  
The causal chain can be described as follows. Unenlightened souls 
enter the world ignorant of the illusionary nature of reality. This breeds 
karma, which roughly translates to “work”. Karma refers to the 
intentional deeds we perform with our body, speech and mind, through 
action, talking and thinking (KONG, 1999, p. 91). We possess an 
impulse to engage in karma, because we perceive these deeds to be real. 
This impulse results in consciousness, which materializes itself as a 
mortal being. The being acquires a sense of identity, and becomes aware 
of its existence through sensory perception, which is regulated by the 
mind. In the process of conscious existence, the senses are constantly 
brought into contact with material objects, giving rise to sensation. 
Sensation in turn generates craving, which leads us to cling onto material 
objects. The unwillingness to let go leads to another process of 
becoming, culminating in another mortal birth. The new birth is 
consigned hence to another lifetime, eventually resulting in death, 
whereby the cycle starts again. This chain of causation is believed to 
govern the entire phenomenon of existence, and its perpetuating nature 
is the mechanism for trapping living beings in samsara. In order to attain 
liberation, the causal chain must be broken. 
3.4 Concentric sector – the six realms of existence 
The next concentric sector consists of six zones, known as the six 
realms of existence. The three realms indicated on the upper part of the 
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wheel are the realms of gods, demigods and humans, with conditions 
more favorable than the lower realms of animals, hungry ghosts and hell-
beings. Each realm is symbolically depicted by an illustration which 
highlights its essential aspects. For example, the realm of gods depicts 
celestial beings indulging in merriment. While some still believe that the 
six realms are actual physical locations in the universe, modern Buddhist 
teachings perceive them as metaphorical projections of our mind states 
(KONG, 1999). For example, a miser constantly craving for wealth can 
be seen as dwelling in the realm of hungry ghosts, where desire is 
insatiable. If one constantly relies on primitive instincts and is primarily 
motivated by food, sleep and sex, he may be seen as dwelling in the 
animal realm. Conversely, one who experiences peace and joy is likely to 
be dwelling in the realm of gods. In line with the notion that all existence 
is in a continual state of flux, it is also believed that a living being transits 
through these mind-states as a matter of daily experience. An excerpt 
from a talk given by Ngak’chang Rinpoche (1994), a prominent Buddhist 
advocate, will clarify this viewpoint. 
[…] as models of mind-states, the six realms are actually very 
useful indeed. Hell is actually here and now ... You only have to 
look at the newspaper to find hell (referring to the reporting of 
tragedies and disasters). You only have to look at the 
advertisements to find the god realm (referring to luxuries), or at 
least the insinuation that it’s possible to coax it into existence … 
3.5 Hub of wheel – the mental ills: desire, hatred and ignorance 
The innermost sector of the Wheel is divided into two parts. At 
the very centre, three animals; the rooster, snake and boar represent 
desire, hatred and ignorance respectively. These mental ills are identified 
as the “roots of all evil”, (BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO, 1970, p. 16) and 
are chiefly responsible for living beings not realizing the true nature of 
reality. Chasing each other, they form a cycle which indicates a close 
relationship between the mental ills. Desire for success causes us to be 
attached to material phenomena; hatred towards others breeds anger and 
resentment. Ignorance of the impermanence of material reality, and the 
mechanism of samsara, causes us to fall victim to it repeatedly. It is thus 
imperative to recognize and remove these attitudes. 
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Between the three animals and the six realms, a half black-and-
white circle depicts the intermediary phase between death and rebirth. 
Beings in the white half are seen to be ascending, as they will be reborn 
into one of the higher realms, while those in the black half are 
descending to take rebirth in the lower realms. 
Having briefly introduced the basic concepts in the Wheel, I will 
now proceed to the actual analysis of the metaphors used to illustrate 
these target concepts. 
4 STATES OF BEING 
4.1 Physical representation of states of being 
As the name suggests, the “Wheel of life” predominantly 
comprises concepts pertaining to mortal life. The previously mentioned 
twelvefold chain of causation, six realms of mortal existence, and the 
three mental ills of mortal beings are fully represented within and only 
within the spatial confines of the Wheel image, demarcated into three 
concentric sectors. Yama, depicted as the manipulator of the Wheel, and 
Buddha, who has attained enlightenment, are clearly transcendent to 
mortal conditions, and are therefore spatially located outside of the 
Wheel. 
The dichotomy between the inside and outside of the wheel thus 
corresponds to being in and out of the mortal state. Such a depiction 
evidently draws upon the primary metaphor STATES ARE 
LOCATIONS, whereby states are conceptualized as bounded regions in 
space, possessing an interior, exterior and boundary (LAKOFF; 
JOHNSON, 1999, p. 180). Accordingly, the correlation between states 
and locations is caused by early experiences of feeling a certain state 
while physically situated in a certain location. (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 
1999, p. 52). By this metaphorical inference, Yama and Buddha, who are 
out of the mortal state, are also out of the Wheel’s physical space. 
It should also be noted that the three animals situated at the hub 
of the wheel represent the most fundamental mental ills that are situated 
in the core of our being (BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO, 1970). Clearly, a 
degree of emphasis is accorded to the centre, as compared to other parts 
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of the Wheel. This conceptualization of the centre as more significant 
than the periphery is also present in English expressions such as “He is 
at the centre of attention” and “I belong to the fringes of society”. Here 
I propose the primary metaphor IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL 
(conversely, LESS IMPORTANT IS PERIPHERAL), where the 
evaluation of relative importance is conceptualized in terms of central-
peripheral spatial perception. 
The justification is as follows. In our bodily interactions with the 
world, we are always constrained by the locus of our sensory 
perceptions. As we move about, the centre of our cognition follows us, 
and we constantly take ourselves as a point of reference in relation to the 
environment. Hence, from early life, we develop a strong distinction 
between the centre – our site of consciousness, and the peripheral – the 
external world as defined by the locus of our sensory perceptions. 
In early life, we likely perceive the centrality of our consciousness 
as more significant than peripheral objects and people. It has been 
suggested that prior to the acquisition of cognitive mechanisms such as 
the theory-of-mind (PREMACK; WOODRUFF, 1978), young children 
are unable to empathize and thus cannot appreciate the needs and wants 
of others, who are at the periphery of their senses. This repeated co-
occurrence of the sensorimotor experience of centrality and subjective 
judgment of importance would then lead to a conflation between the 
two conceptual domains, which may be differentiated only after the 
acquisition of a theory-of-mind. 
Hence, when IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL is combined with 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS, the inference is that states at the centre 
are more significant than states at the periphery, which exactly accounts 
for the illustration. The animals at the hub of the Wheel are hence 
understood as the most fundamental mental ills. 
Subdivisions of the Wheel into smaller spaces are also used to 
represent a variety of sub-states. Wheel spokes create the physical 
demarcations, which divide up the twelve different links in the chain of 
causation, and the six different realms of existence. According to 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS, we would expect the interpretation to be 
that these causal links and realms are separate and independent of one 
another. Between the realm of gods and demigods, a tree is drawn to 
physically connect the two realms to symbolize the constant effort of 
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demigods to access into the superior realm of gods. Hence, transforming 
from one state to another is equivalent to the physical transference of 
locations. In addition, the movement from demigods to gods is depicted 
as an upward climb, as the demigods see the other realm as more 
desirable. This correspondence between verticality and superiority is one 
of the many instances in which spatial orientation correlates with our 
subjective experiences (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999). 
4.2 Symbolic representation within the realms 
We now focus specifically on the six realms, which depict the 
living conditions of gods, demigods, hungry ghosts, humans, animals and 
hell-beings. If we adopt the previously mentioned interpretation that the 
realms are “models of mind states” (NGAK’CHANG, 1994), 
symbolizing our daily mental experiences and emotions, we can 
investigate how specific conditions in the realms metaphorically 
represent these states of mind that we experience. Therefore, while in 
the preceding section we explored how these mind-states are generally 
conceptualized as locations, we now examine how the mind-states are 
individually conceptualized. For example, the intense heat suffered by 
hell beings is believed to symbolize the tremendous anger and hatred 
these beings possess (KONG, 1999, p. 124). 
Other mind-states that are represented in similar ways include 
frustration, jealousy and desire. The diagram makes it clear that these are 
illustrated via different source domains, but it is important to question 
whether there is an embodied basis to them (i.e. whether these subjective 
experiences are conceptualized via domains of embodied experience). 
When we probe into how these subjective experiences are metaphorically 
represented in the illustrations, we discover the repeated usage of these 
source domains: 
a) Heat and cold 
b) Hunger  
c) Physical pain 
Situations of extreme hotness and coldness are depicted in both 
the realms of hell and hungry ghosts. In hell, commonly subdivided into 
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“hot” and “cold”, creatures are shown to be tormented either by 
continuous burning or freezing. The experience of such intense heat and 
coldness is believed to correspond to experiencing the emotions of anger 
and apathy respectively (KONG, 1999). According to Ngak’chang 
(1994), “anger is the root of the (hot) hell realm”, because the endless 
process of torture is triggered by a vicious cycle of anger. As a living 
being undergoes suffering, it experiences anger against its tormentors 
and itself. This generates more heat and suffering, and more anger in 
return. As Ngak’chang (1994) elaborates, “this hell condition is one in 
which the experiential situation becomes so intense that the only response to 
it is to create further intensity (emphasis mine)”. Therefore, there is a 
perpetuating relationship between anger and heat. 
Conversely, in the cold hell, one becomes “catatonic, completely 
and utterly frozen” (NGAK’CHANG, 1994), apathetic and resigned to 
the surrounding state of suffering. Being physically frozen thus 
represents a feeling of apathy towards self and others. 
This would suggest the presence of metaphors such as ANGER 
IS HEAT and APATHY IS COLDNESS, where the former has already 
been demonstrated to possess an embodied basis (LAKOFF, 1987). 
However, they are unlikely to be reducible to primary metaphors, for 
several reasons. Firstly, although these emotions are significant in the 
Wheel, it is doubtful as to whether relatively complex emotions such as 
apathy and anger are experienced early in life. Secondly, to claim that 
emotions are wholly structured by conceptual metaphors would be to 
overlook the actual culture-specific situations that trigger such emotions 
in the first place, which may depend more on the interpersonal than the 
individual embodied plane. In his study on emotive behavior, Lazarus 
(1991) distinguishes between “core relational themes” (p. 359), which are 
biological universals that give us the capacity to feel emotions, and the 
actual manifestation of specific emotions such as anger, hatred and fear, 
which are regulated by culture-specific understandings. Hence, specific 
emotions are not embodied as part of our neurobiological makeup, as 
compared to the general emotional experiencing capacity. This brings us 
back to the alternative viewpoint of cultural models (QUINN, 1991). It 
seems that when discussing emotions, cultural understandings of what 
constitutes, justifies or evokes them play at least an equal role compared 
to universal embodied experiences. 
Linguagem em (Dis)curso - LemD, v. 7, n. 3, p. 453-485, set./dez. 2007 
468
Situations of hunger are also depicted in the Wheel. In the realm 
of animals, hunger causes the beasts to slaughter each other. In the 
hungry ghost realm, creatures desire food, but are unable to swallow due 
to their elongated throats. They also possess bloated bellies which render 
digestion impossible. Although they taste food in their mouths, they 
soon realize that their hunger and thirst can never be satisfied. This is 
used to represent the insatiable greed possessed by some individuals, 
who may be undergoing semblances of positive experience, but 
continuously yearn for more (KONG, 1999, p. 126). In his comments 
about the hungry ghost realm, Ngak’chang Rinpoche makes vivid use of 
the food metaphor to describe the extent of insatiable desire. 
The yidag (hungry ghost) is a being with a huge mouth and a very 
thin neck. It can get a hell of a lot into its mouth but it can’t 
swallow anything… It’s a bit like going to some amazing 
restaurant where the food is wonderful but you slather all over 
the table cloth and dribble on the waiter’s arm…you end up 
spitting it across the room and vomiting on the carpet because 
you want to stuff it all down at once…there’s so much food in 
your mouth at once, but you can’t take it out either, because you 
are starving… 
That points towards the metaphor DESIRE IS HUNGER. 
English expressions for this metaphor include “I am hungry for 
success”, “That is a mouth-watering prospect”, “The sight of that makes 
me salivate” etc. Unlike the conceptualizations of anger and apathy, there 
is justification that DESIRE IS HUNGER is a primary metaphor. 
Research has demonstrated that infants cry mainly to express basic 
physiological needs, and amongst them the most fundamental is hunger 
(CHAVEZ; MARTINEZ, 1979; BARRETT; FRANK, 1987). Abraham 
Maslow’s theory of the hierarchy of needs likewise acknowledges the 
fundamental position that physiological needs such as hunger and thirst 
occupy in the general well-being of a human (MASLOW, 1954). As 
physiological needs are a reflection of our neurobiological makeup as 
humans, they are likely to be universally valid. Therefore, for an infant, 
hunger and desire are likely to be experienced simultaneously on a 
frequent basis, resulting in conflation and subsequent primary metaphor 
formation. 
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Pain is another common means of conceptualizing subjective 
experiences. In the realms of gods and demigods, the actions taken by 
the relatively inferior demigods to attain the status of gods are depicted 
by a scene of physical combat. Failure to achieve their goal, resulting in 
emotional hurt, is equivalent to losing the battle and sustaining physical 
injury. Likewise, in the realm of hell, constant physical pain represents 
various kinds of hurt and distress. 
It appears that the sensation of physical pain is consistently used 
to represent all types of ill-being in general. We may tentatively posit 
another primary metaphor, ILL-BEING IS PHYSICAL PAIN. The 
experience of physical pain is present since early infancy, and the 
numerous sources of pain include sore tender muscles, sensitive tissues, 
and general infections. Moreover, the sensation of pain is often more 
acute for infants, whose pain-controlling nerves are yet to be developed. 
This primary metaphor is present in English expressions such as “That 
was a painful lesson learnt”, “She hurt him with words”, and “Ouch!” 
(when expressing loss). 
5 PERPETUATION 
5.1 Perpetual rebirth 
Another concept associated with the Wheel is that of perpetual 
rebirth. In many commentaries, the Wheel of Life is referred to as the 
“Wheel of Cyclic Existence” or the “Wheel of Wandering On” 
(BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO, 1970), indicating that a living being, upon 
death, re-enters into existence once again in the same unenlightened 
condition, as if finding himself at the original starting point of some 
journey. The living being is trapped in a cycle, unaware that it is about to 
be brought back once again to the starting point by the turning of the 
Wheel. Unless one regains his volition and deviates from the path, he 
will inevitably be brought back to the starting point by the force that 
turns the Wheel. 
The above conceptualization of existence as a circular journey 
seems to have been built around familiar primary metaphors such as 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, CAUSES ARE PHYSICAL 
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FORCES and ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOTIONS. This 
is largely similar to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) discussion of LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY, where life purposes are journey destinations, and difficulties 
in life are journey impediments. Liberation, the ultimate purpose, is 
conceptualized as a spatial destination beyond the confines of the Wheel, 
while the undesirable condition of samsara is depicted as a return to the 
original point, and hence, the non-arrival at the appropriate destination. 
Our inability to prevent ourselves from returning to the starting point is 
conceptualized as due to the force of desire that keeps us on the same 
track, and the appropriate response is to take proactive action in order to 
overcome the force, regain volition and deviate from the circular motion.  
5.2 The embodied basis of perpetuation 
When we consider our experiences of spatial movement, we begin 
to see how perpetuation can be conceptualized as constantly moving in a 
circular manner. We know that traveling along a linear path would ensure 
our arrival at a destination away from the starting point, while walking in 
a circle always brings us back to the same point. Additionally, if the 
radius of the circle is large enough, the traveler may not even realize he is 
on a circular path. A clear example is the circumnavigation of a ship, 
where traveling in a “great circle” means traveling a maximum distance 
on the earth’s surface, on a seemingly straight route. Just as a traveler 
walking in a large circle is unaware of circumambulation, a traveler on 
the long journey of existence does not realize he is on a cyclical path. 
However, it may be argued that the actual bodily experience of 
walking in circles is not a frequent occurrence. It is untenable to imagine 
any culture where people habitually walk in circles. The notion that 
circular travel brings us back to the starting point might not be 
experientially acquired, but is instead likely to be inferred from our 
knowledge of traveling, plus some basic understanding of geometry. 
Thus the metaphor PERPETUAL EXISTENCE IS TRAVELING IN 
CIRCLES is a complex metaphor (made up of familiar primary 
metaphors such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, CAUSES 
ARE FORCES and ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED 
MOTIONS), but the essential component of circular travel, however, 
cannot be reduced to any primary metaphor. We might then again look 
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to cultural models for an explanation. Pre-existing cultural beliefs of 
recurring existence becomes the motivation for the metaphor of 
circularity, instead of a highly implausible experiential basis. Since a 
complex metaphor is supposedly made up of a core of primary 
metaphors, plus some culture-specific belief (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 
1999, p. 60), the Lakoffian school might be tempted to simply shift the 
notion of circularity into the latter, and claim that the same pool of 
primary metaphors universally underlies any conceptualization of life as a 
journey. However, I feel that to isolate the notion of circularity from the 
notion of traveling this way would be an artificial treatment of Buddhist 
philosophy, since they are inextricably related in Buddhist understanding. 
A more plausible explanation would be the appeal to cultural models, 
which will accommodate a completely different Buddhist notion in its 
entirety. 
6 EVENT STRUCTURE 
6.1 Radical differences in event structure concepts 
This section deals with “event structure concepts” – states, 
changes, causes and effects, which are crucial in reasoning about how the 
world fundamentally operates. The Buddhist understanding of event 
structure concepts is laid out in the twelve-fold chain of causation, 
governed by the principle of dependent origination. However, before 
analyzing the metaphorical depiction of event structure in Buddhism for 
its reducibility to primary metaphors, it is of great importance to 
emphasize the radical differences between the more familiar “western” 
concept of event structure, and its Buddhist counterpart. Throughout 
the section, for ease of exposition, the term “western causation” will be 
used to refer to concepts of event structure as characterised by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999). It is not my intention to create a false dichotomy 
between “east” and “west”, or to claim that Lakoff and Johnson have 
dealt with the latter in an exclusive sense. My intention is to highlight the 
different possible ways that event structure concepts can be understood, 
using Buddhist philosophy as an example. 
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The familiar, “western” concepts of event structure and the 
metaphorical ways we reason about them are discussed by Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) in some detail. They formulate a prototype of causation 
(p. 177), which forms the basic source from which various different ways 
of reasoning about causation may develop. The embodied basis of event 
structure concepts may be seen in this prototype. I will discuss two 
major aspects of this prototypical causation and the primary metaphors 
that motivate them, and proceed to demonstrate the absence of these 
aspects in Buddhism. 
Firstly, there is a causal factor that results in a change of state, and 
this causal factor is conceptualized as a force. States themselves can be 
either conceptualized as spatial locations (STATES ARE LOCATIONS), 
or as objects/possessions (ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS). The 
causal force results in a change of state either by acting on the original 
state to move it to a new location (e.g. “Hitler brought Germany into 
war”) or by resulting in a transfer of possessions (e.g. “The noise gave 
me a headache”). In both cases, the primary metaphor CAUSES ARE 
FORCES is used. In its most prototypical case, the force is volitionally 
applied by a human agent to change something in the immediate 
environment by direct contact. Extensions of this central prototype may 
yield different metaphors of causation, but they are all ultimately 
reducible to CAUSES ARE FORCES  
Secondly, the cause is always conceived as temporally preceding 
the effect, which entails that the effect cannot be manifested unless the 
cause has already appeared. There is a strict cause-causation-effect sequence 
that governs every causal relationship. The presence of the cause is the 
definitive starting point, and the manifestation of the effect is the end 
point. The process of causation bridges the gap between the two. This 
forms the basis for the primary metaphor CAUSAL PRIORITY IS 
TEMPORAL PRIORITY (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999, p. 209). 
Buddhist event structure, however, is starkly different. Broadly 
speaking, it is believed that events in this world are interrelated, 
constituting each other’s causes and manifesting as each other’s effects. 
The twelve-fold chain of causation demonstrates how a cause is itself an 
effect of a previous cause, and that all these causes are operating 
simultaneously, such that causes and effects always co-exist. This implies 
that we cannot isolate a definitive starting point for any causal 
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relationship, since there is always the presence of another prior cause. 
Even at the “localized” level of causation, where a singular event is 
observed in isolation, Buddhists hesitate to conclude that a specific cause 
precedes an effect, due to the interrelated and evanescent “flow” of 
reality as we perceive it. I shall term such a lack of sequentiality and 
indeterminability of a “first cause” as the interconnectedness characteristic of 
Buddhist causation. 
A second important characteristic is what I term non-agency. Unlike 
prototypical western causation, where some agency, human or non-
human, is overtly stated or at least implied, Buddhist causation does not 
attribute change of state to any agency. The progression from one state 
to another occurs without any conscious manipulation of the states. This 
resembles what Lakoff and Johnson would term as “natural causation” 
(1999, p. 213), a less prototypical form of western causation.  
Perhaps the most baffling characteristic would be what 
Malalasekera (1968, p. 71) calls consecution. As mentioned, western 
causation sees the shift from cause to effect as the result of the 
straightforward application of a causal factor, bringing about a direct 
change of state. However, in Buddhist causation, the shift is not a direct 
change of the state of affairs, but rather a “constant, uninterrupted, 
infinitely graduated change” (MALALASEKERA, 1968, p. 71). The 
“gap” between cause and effect is seen as an infinite number of instants, 
such that there is no obvious and detectable shift. This is the reason why 
there is an overwhelming impetus for Buddhists to focus on the absolute 
“present moment”, since it is the instantaneous moment that underlies 
the flux of reality. The peculiarity of such a conception has led 
Malalasekera to suggest taking the extreme step of abandoning the 
notion of causation altogether in Buddhist philosophy. Observing the 
non-discrete progression from cause to effect, he comments, “Strictly 
speaking, there is no causality at all, no production of one from the 
other” (1968, p. 71). 
To see how the characteristics of interconnectedness, non-agency 
and consecution relate to each other, I return to the oil lamp example. In 
Buddhist terms, it is inaccurate to say that the air, oil and heat cause the 
lamp to burn. Rather, between the process of combustion and the 
lighting of the flame, there is an infinite amount of “air-containing, oil-
containing and flame-containing moments” etc, coming together to 
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result in the flame (consecution). We cannot pin down any of these 
infinite moments as a definitive starting point, or decide whether the 
“air-containing moments” precede the “flame-containing moments” 
(interconnectedness). Neither can we determine the agency that is 
directly responsible for the process (non-agency). 
Having contrasted the two sets of event-structure concepts, it 
should be clear that reducing the Buddhist concepts to the same set of 
primary metaphors that underlie the western concepts would be 
problematic. To draw this conclusion, we now turn to the Wheel, and 
examine the actual metaphorical depiction of event structure more 
closely. Two separate metaphors, which I label as the chain and arising 
metaphors, will be discussed. 
6.2 The chain metaphor 
Via this metaphor, each of the twelve elements is depicted as a 
separate link, interconnected to form a chain. Every individual link is tied 
to the next link, and is conceptualized as being its cause. Likewise, each 
link is also connected to the one before, and is seen as the effect of the 
previous link. 
This conceptualization of a physical linkage as a causal 
relationship is discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 211), when 
they consider English expressions such as “AIDS is tied to the HIV 
virus” and “AIDS has been closely linked to the HIV virus”, which are 
interpreted as meaning that the HIV virus causes AIDS. They call this 
the causal link metaphor, which applies the object event-structure 
metaphor to a situation whereby two objects, A and B, are tied together. 
This is spelt out below: 
 
 Source-domain knowledge: If Object B is tied tightly to 
Object A, and if X has Object A, then the tie between 
Object A and Object B will result in X having Object B. 
 
which is mapped onto the target-domain knowledge: 
 
 If Attribute B is causally closely correlated with Attribute A, 
and if X has attribute A, then the close causal correlation 
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between Attribute A and Attribute B will result in X also 
having Attribute B. 
 
In short, closely correlated attributes are conceptualized as closely 
juxtaposed objects, and the correlation is conceptualized as the physical 
link between the objects. This correlation implies a causal relationship 
because when objects are linked, the presence of one object will result in 
the presence of the other. The causal force varies with the strength of 
the physical link. (Compare “AIDS is strongly linked to the HIV virus” 
with “remotely linked”). This is how the causal link metaphor reduces to 
CAUSES ARE FORCES. 
We see how the chain metaphor illustrates the characteristic of 
interconnectedness. At every causal link, one link results in the next. 
(e.g., Ignorance is linked to impulse, and results in impulse). The 
interlocking of all twelve causal links into one chain implies that there is 
no “beginning” link, just as there is no “first cause” in Buddhist 
causation. Another interesting inference, unrelated to causal links, is that 
the chain of causation is what exactly “chains” us to the bondage of 
rebirth (BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO, 1970). However, the chain 
metaphor does not adequately conceptualize Buddhist causation, as it 
excludes the characteristics of non-agency and consecution. 
6.3 The arising metaphor 
Another metaphor commonly used to conceptualize causation is 
in terms of an upward motion, or arising, of an effect from a cause. 
Although the process of arising is not visible in the diagram of the wheel, 
numerous commentaries make use of this metaphor (BHIKKHU 
KHANTIPALO, 1970; KONG, 1999). The object moving upwards is 
the effect, while the upward motion is the process of causation. The 
causal force is the force enabling the upward motion. As already noted in 
section two, the Buddha summarizes the principle of dependent 
origination with the following verse (KONG, 1999, p. 146): 
When this is, that is. 
This arising, that arises. 
When this is not, that is not. 
This ceasing, that ceases. 
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where “this” and “that” refer to twelve elements of the Wheel, which 
arise out of one another. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 213) have already 
dealt with the arising metaphor, labeling it as an instance of “natural 
causation”. The verb “arise” is commonly used in passive constructions, 
as in the following example, “a problem has arisen in Bosnia”. The 
agency of the arising process is unclear, and attributed to some natural 
situation. This is often exploited in situations whereby it is pragmatic to 
hide the true agency of an event (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999, p. 213). 
In this way, the arising metaphor illustrates the characteristic of 
non-agency. Comments such as “where contact arises, feeling exists” and 
“when feelings arise, cravings are produced” (BHIKKHU 
KHANTIPALO, 1970, p. 39-40) do not inform us who/what brought 
about the arising of contact and feelings. 
Crucially however, like the chain metaphor above, the arising 
metaphor can only account for the characteristic of non-agency. In both 
these metaphors, the causal force cannot provide a complete 
conceptualization of Buddhist causation. Indeed, the radical 
characteristic of consecution does not appear to be reducible to 
CAUSES ARE FORCES, or any primary metaphor for that matter. The 
idea that there are an infinite number of moments bridging the gap 
between cause and effect does away with the need for a distinct causal 
force. This raises a key problem for the Lakoffian position, which claims 
that all theories of causation are reducible to CAUSES ARE FORCES. 
There are a few possible responses to this. 
6.4 Possible responses 
Firstly, we can also modify the scope of the primary metaphor 
CAUSES ARE FORCES, by reconsidering what is exactly meant by a 
force. The concept of force itself is prototypical, varying along 
dimensions such as magnitude, direction and the inherent nature of the 
force. Within the domain of physics, scholars have located numerous 
elusive forces at the atomic and nuclear levels, and are still attempting to 
unify them under a singular theory. This suggests that the concept of 
forces, and hence the nature and characteristics of the source domain, 
has yet to be precisely spelt out. CAUSES ARE FORCES admits only 
the most straightforward of forces, i.e. direct physical manipulation. 
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While it is admissible that this is indeed a recurring bodily experience, the 
case of consecution has revealed its inadequacy. 
Secondly, besides CAUSES ARE FORCES, we can include other 
metaphorical conceptualizations of causes into Lakoff and Johnson’s 
prototype. That is to say, their prototype can be expanded beyond what 
they call the fundamental case of direct object manipulation (LAKOFF; 
JOHNSON, 1999, p. 177). For example, it is possible to suggest that the 
infinite amount of instantaneous moments between cause and effect is 
enabled not by a force, but by a continuous supply of energy that 
maintains the moments. At the very least, this conceptualization 
eliminates the need to adhere to a cause-causation-effect sequence, since 
“causal energy” is possessed simultaneously at all three stages. The point 
is that causes need not always be forces, as long as within the source 
domain, the object successfully undergoes some physical change. 
Thirdly, which I feel to be the ideal option, is to revisit the 
alternative viewpoints; particularly, the notion of cultural understandings 
constraining choice of metaphors (QUINN, 1991). The individual 
possesses a pre-existing knowledge of the characteristics of Buddhist 
causation, and this is neither dependent on nor structured by metaphors. 
Instead, the individual can focus on one characteristic at a time, and 
select an appropriate metaphor that is sufficient to illustrate that 
particular characteristic. This appears to be the case in the Wheel, as the 
chain metaphor specifically illustrates interconnectedness, while the 
arising metaphor illustrates non-agency. Another metaphor may serve to 
illustrate consecution, but it does not have to be coherent with the other 
two. 
Appealing to the cultural basis of metaphor in this instance (and 
hence arriving at conclusion ii) mentioned in section 1.1) may quickly 
resolve the conflict that the Lakoffian analyst faces, in forcibly 
attempting to find metaphorical coherence between the three interrelated 
characteristics of Buddhist causation. As Quinn and colleagues would 
agree, instead of attempting to locate a universal metaphorical 
mechanism underlying both western and Buddhist concepts of causation, 
we can shift the explanatory burden away from metaphor to culture – 
our understanding of the world is not constituted by universal 
conceptual metaphors, but by culture-specific models instead. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary of findings 
My aim was to investigate the universality of primary metaphors 
using Buddhist concepts. After analyzing their reducibility, we are now in 
a position to draw some conclusions that will shed light on the 
theoretical debate concerning the constitutive role of metaphor in 
thought and cognition. 
In section three, the Buddhist conceptualization of various states 
of being were discussed, from their physical organization in the Wheel, 
to the characteristics that defined the individual realms. IMPORTANT 
IS CENTRAL and STATES ARE LOCATIONS were found to underlie 
the schematic layout of the Wheel. Within the realms themselves, 
DESIRE IS HUNGER and ILL-BEING IS PHYSICAL PAIN underlie 
the conceptualization of desire and ill-being. However, despite the 
embodied experiences of hotness and coldness being used to 
conceptualize anger and apathy, I hesitate to argue for the presence of 
primary metaphors, due to the lack of universality of these subjective 
emotions. 
In section four, the concept of perpetuation – an endless series of 
rebirths – was discussed. The complex metaphor PERPETUAL 
EXISTENCE IS TRAVELING IN CIRCLES was found to share the 
same set of primary metaphors as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, but the crucial 
component of circularity itself cannot be reduced to primary metaphors, 
due to the lack of any plausible experiential basis. 
In section five, I examined the concept of causation. I emphasized 
the radical difference between Buddhist and western conceptualizations 
of causation, and identified the three defining characteristics of the 
former – interconnectedness, non-agency and consecution. These were 
found not to fit in with Lakoff and Johnson’s causal prototype (1999, p. 
177), which critically depends on CAUSES ARE FORCES. 
On the whole then, among the three logical conclusions spelt out 
in section 1.1, we seem to have arrived at conclusion ii). Within a slice of 
Buddhist philosophy itself, some concepts are found to reduce to 
primary metaphors, while others are not. Far from dismissing the 
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universalist claim too quickly, I would like to offer a more detailed 
explanation as to why the irreducible concepts turned out to be so. 
7.2 Irreducibility - a closer look at primary metaphor 
The concept of primary metaphor involves the universal co-
occurrence of subjective and sensorimotor experiences in early life. 
While our common neurobiological makeup provides reason to believe 
in universal sensorimotor experiences, it is far more difficult to justify 
the universality of subjective judgements. The analysis of emotions such 
as anger and apathy reveal that seemingly basic subjective experiences are 
far from monolithic, and should not be assumed to correlate with any 
specific sensorimotor experience, without taking into account the 
influence of cultural situations. Extrapolating from this line of argument, 
if we examine Lakoff and Johnson’s list of primary metaphors (1999, p. 
50), we will realize that justification has yet to be provided for the 
assumed cultural independence of subjective judgements and experiences 
such as affection, importance, happiness, intimacy etc. After appreciating 
the significant differences in Buddhist concepts, the reader should realize 
that there is every possibility for these subjective experiences to be 
differently interpreted and experienced by different communities around 
the world. 
It appears then, that some primary metaphors themselves already 
carry culture-specific meanings. Recalling the analysis of Buddhist 
causation, where CAUSES ARE FORCES was found to be inadmissible, 
it appears that rather than CAUSES ARE FORCES underlying the 
conceptualization of causation, there exits wholly different and 
independent conceptualizations altogether. Instead, CAUSES ARE 
FORCES should be treated as a complex metaphor, and Lakoff and 
Johnson’s discussion should be viewed as a culture-specific model of 
causation, instead of a universal one. Hopefully, the discussion of 
Buddhist concepts in this paper has helped to illuminate this subtle 
point. 
7.3 Directions for further discussion 
I conclude by recommending that the key direction to take in 
further investigation of the universalist claim should be to explore ideas 
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and concepts from cultures and traditions that are intuitively different 
from the western one, which some might be tempted to label as “exotic” 
cultures. The present analysis of the Wheel of Life has thrown up some 
inadequacies of the universalist account, but much more remains to 
examined, even within Buddhism itself. Metaphorical conceptualizations 
of compassion and wisdom, for example, would all be excellent choices 
for future work. On the other hand, for the Lakoffian school, the onus is 
to provide a justification for the assumed universality of subjective 
judgements and experiences, which are supposed to co-occur with 
universal sensorimotor experiences. Whichever side one is on, there is 
definitely much more empirical work waiting to be done in our quest 
towards understanding the complex relationship between metaphor, 
culture and cognition. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Diagram – Wheel of Life. 
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Título: Investigando a universalidade de metáforas primárias: a perspectiva do 
Budismo 
Autor: Dennis Tay Zhiming 
Resumo: Nesse trabalho, examino a “Roda da Vida”, uma representação diagramática 
de conceitos filosóficos budistas significativos, a partir da perspectiva da metáfora 
conceitual (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1980, 1999). Conceitos abstratos que definem 
nossas realidades diárias (e.g. estados, causalidade, temporalidade) são definidos por 
alguns pesquisadores como metaforicamente construídos, e, portanto, reduzíveis a um 
conjunto universal de metáforas primárias (GRADY, 1997; LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 
1999), enquanto outros os vêem como conhecimentos estruturados não metafóricos e 
culturalmente compartilhados (D’ANDRADE, 1990, QUINN, 1991). Reconhecendo a 
necessidade de uma testagem rigorosa da asserção universalista, preferencialmente 
através do uso de dados o mais distante possíveis da tradição filosófica ‘ocidental’, 
decidi analisar os conceitos budistas de estados de coisa, perpetuação do renascimento, 
e estrutura de eventos, devido a sua reducibilidade a metáforas primárias. Demonstro 
que, enquanto alguns conceitos budistas são redutíveis às mesmas metáforas primárias 
que seus correspondentes ‘ocidentais’, por outro lado, outros conceitos, 
particularmente a noção de causalidade, talvez sejam constituídos por conhecimentos 
culturalmente específicos. Concluo questionando o próprio conceito de metáfora 
primária, examinando até que ponto metáforas primárias supostamente universais já 
carregam em si preconceitos culturalmente determinados, e argumento que o ônus da 
defesa está com a escola Lakoffiana, que precisa justificar a suposta universalidade de 
experiências e julgamentos subjetivos que geram as metáforas primárias. 
Palavras-chave: Budismo; metáforas primárias; metáforas conceituais; modelos 
culturais. 
 
Titre: Recherchant l’universalité de métaphores primaires: la perspectif du Buddhism 
Auteur: Dennis Tay Zhiming 
Résumé: Dans ce travail, je fais l’analyse de la « Roue de la Vie », une représentation 
diagrammatique de concepts philosophiques bouddhistes significatifs, à partir de la 
perspective de la métaphore conceptuelle (LAKOFF ; JOHNSON, 1980, 1999). Des 
concepts abstraits qui définissent nos réalités quotidiennes (e. g. États, causalité, 
temporalité), sont définis par quelques chercheurs comme construits d’une manière 
métaphorique, et, pourtant, réductibles à un ensemble universel de métaphores 
primaires (GRADY, 1997 ; LAKOFF ; JOHNSON, 1999), pendant que d’autres les 
voient comme des connaissances structurées non métaphoriques et culturellement 
partagées (D’ANDRADE, 1990 ; QUINN, 1991). Tout en reconnaissant le besoin de 
l’essai strict de l’assertion universelle, surtout à travers l’emploi de donnés le plus 
lointain possible de la tradition philosophique ‘occidentale’, j’ai pris la décision 
d’analyser les concepts bouddhistes d’état de choses, perpétuité du renouvellement, 
structure d’évenements, dû à leur réducibilité aux métaphores primaires. Je démontre 
que, pendant que quelques concepts bouddhistes sont réductibles aux mêmes 
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métaphores primaires que leurs correspondants ‘occidentaux’, d’autre part, d’autres 
concepts, surtout la notion de causalité, peut-être, soient constitués par des 
connaissances culturellement spécifiques. Je finis tout en mettant en question le 
concept lui-même de métaphore primaire, analysant jusqu’où des métaphores primaires 
hypothétiquement universelles apportent en soi des préjugés culturellement determinés, 
et j’argumente que le fardeau de la défense se trouve dans l’École Lakoffienne, qui a 
besoin de justifier la supposée universalité d’expériences et jugements subjectifs qui 
engendrent les métaphores primaires. 
Mots-clés: Bouddhisme; métaphores primaires; métaphores conceptuelles; modèles 
culturels. 
 
Título: Investigando la universalidad de metáforas primarias 
Autor: Dennis Tay Zhiming 
Resumen: En este trabajo, examino la “Rueda de la Vida”, una representación 
diagramática de conceptos filosóficos budistas significativos, a partir de la perspectiva 
de la metáfora conceptual (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1980, 1999). Conceptos abstractos 
que definen nuestras realidades diarias (e.g. estados, causalidad, temporalidad) son 
definidos por algunos investigadores como metafóricamente construidos, y, por lo 
tanto, reductibles a un conjunto universal de metáforas primarias (GRADY, 1997; 
LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999), mientras que otros los ven como conocimientos 
estructurados no metafóricos y culturalmente compartidos (D’ANDRADE, 1990, 
QUINN, 1991). Reconociendo la necesidad de una prueba rigurosa de la aserción 
universalista, preferentemente a través del uso de datos lo más distante posibles de la 
tradición filosófica ‘occidental’, decidí analizar los conceptos budistas de estados de 
cosa, perpetuación del renacimiento, y estructura de eventos, debido a su reductibilidad 
a metáforas primarias. Demuestro que, mientras algunos conceptos budistas son 
reductibles a las mismas metáforas primarias que sus correspondientes ‘occidentales’, 
por otro lado, otros conceptos, particularmente la noción de causalidad, tal vez sean 
constituidos por conocimientos culturalmente específicos. Concluyo cuestionando el 
propio concepto de metáfora primaria, examinando hasta que punto metáforas 
primarias supuestamente universales ya cargan en sí preconceptos culturalmente 
determinados, y argumento que el bónus de la defensa está con la escuela Lakoffiana, 
que precisa justificar la supuesta universalidad de experiencias y juicios subjetivos que 
generan las metáforas primarias. 
Palabras-clave: Budismo; metáforas primarias; metáforas conceptuales; modelos 
culturales. 
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